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Climate change is likely to affect human mobility patterns, particularly, in resource-dependent rural 
areas where livelihoods and economic activities are climate-sensitive. This is especially true for a 
country like Pakistan which has a large rural population dependent on agriculture, livestock and 
forestry for its livelihoods. Over the past decades, changing rainfall patterns and temperature 
fluctuations across the country have increased difficulties for those engaged in agriculture and other 
sources of rural livelihoods. Poverty, food insecurity, low human development, poor governance and 
inadequate access to health and education services have exacerbated rural vulnerability which has led 
to the need for rural livelihood diversification. As a consequence, a proportion of the rural population 
has adapted by shifting livelihoods away from the agriculture sector, and in some cases, moving to 
urban areas altogether. While there are limited studies in Pakistan on the phenomenon of rural-to-
urban migration in response to climate change, this synthesis paper is an attempt at filling the 
literature gap on migration as an adaptation strategy in rural communities vulnerable to climatic 
impacts and risks. 
 
By converging Pakistan-specific findings of two research consortia – Pathways for Resilience in 
Semi-arid Economies (PRISE) and Himalayan Adaptation, Water and Resilience Research (HI-
AWARE) – this synthesis explores the linkages between migration and climate change in order to 
understand how migration contributes to adaptation at the household level. Evidence is collected from 
two socio-ecologically diverse regions of Pakistan which were the focus of each multi-country 
research consortium: the semi-arid plains and the Upper Indus Basin (UIB). Case studies were used to 
collect evidence from rural areas of eight districts in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Gilgit-
Baltistan (GB). Based on the research evidence gathered (Salik et al. 2017; Qaisrani et al. 2017), this 
study considers how climate change is impacting rural livelihoods, and what adaptive measures 
households are adopting to reduce livelihood vulnerability to climate risks. Drivers of migration in 
these communities are also analysed to better understand the channels through which climatic (and 
non-climatic) factors affect migration. Finally, the research explores whether rural out-migration is 
indeed an adaptation response to climate and environmental change. 
 
The results of the PRISE and HI-AWARE studies show that rural populations are increasingly 
perceptive of the risks climate change poses to incomes and livelihoods.  Respondents reported 
observing changes in climate conditions over time such as shifts in temperature, precipitation patterns 
and frequency of climate extreme events. Reported livelihood vulnerabilities associated with climate 
change included, among others, a decline in crop yield, periodic crop failure, degradation of 
pasturelands, water contamination, and spread of heat-related water borne diseases. To adapt to such 
changes, communities shared undertaking a number of adaptive measures which varied regionally.  
 
In PRISE sites,1 farmers were adapting to slow-onset climate change by investing in farm inputs, 
mechanisation of farmlands, and crop diversification. In HI-AWARE sites, they introduced new crop 
varieties, changed cropping cycle and patterns, and improved harvesting systems to adapt to 
environmental changes. In some cases, rural households in both areas adapted by shifting livelihoods 
to non-farm activities, and in some cases, shifting away from rural areas altogether. From the analysis 
of the two studies, migration seemed to be a common household strategy to cope with shocks and 
stresses. Depending on the regional and household differences, 20-50% households reported recently 
sponsoring and supporting migration of at least one household member. However, socioeconomic 
factors were a key determinant of migration outcomes. Better wages, work opportunities, living 
standards, access to education and health facilities in urban areas were key factors driving rural-to-
urban migration. Food insecurity, underdevelopment, imperfect landownership rights and tenure 
systems in rural settlements also appeared to be compelling many to out-migrate to urban areas. 
Environmental and climatic factors, such declining crop productivity, increased economic incentives 
for rural out-migration. 
 
                                                            
1 Given their similar geographical locale, the two study areas are referred to as PRISE and HI-AWARE study sites, instead of semi-arid and/or Upper Indus Basin. 
Coincidently, areas with higher number of migrant households were also prone to climate hazards. As 
a result, a significant proportion of respondents had been displaced in the past, incurring human and 
monetary losses. During such duress, migrant remittances worked as a cushion against food 
insecurity, floods, and heat waves etc. Where migration occurred, it was both costly and entailed 
hardships. Nevertheless, the appeal of additional household income in the form of migrant remittances 
persuaded many to sponsor migration of a household member. This faith in migrant remittances was 
not without merit since they did contribute to uplifting the socioeconomic status of migrant 
households by increasing and diversifying income streams. However, not all household members 
benefitted equally from migration, as rural out-migration was male-dominated. Women were not only 
excluded from opportunities for labour migration, they also had to assume additional household 
responsibilities when male household members out-migrated. Based on the synthesis results, the 
following policy recommendations are proposed: 
 
1. Developing a national policy on internal migration. 
There is need for a national policy in Pakistan which can regularise internal mobility and labour 
migration, with a focus on rural-to-urban migration. Such a policy should be well-integrated into 
climate change adaptation policies and action plans, as well with relevant sectoral policies and public 
sector programmes. It should be complemented by investment in research, data collection and 
capacity building to improve understanding of the migration-climate nexus. 
 
2. Monitoring and regulating labour market supply-demand gaps. 
Labour market wage differentials are a primary driver of rural-to-urban migration, therefore, a 
mechanism needs to be developed that can monitor and regulate labour market supply-demand gaps, 
such as the dearth of labour in a particular urban setting, and its surplus in a rural market. Such a 
mechanism can help regulate labour mobility in internal migration hotspots (such as the UIB) by 
‘match-making’ demand and supply of labour (skills and needs). 
 
3. Promoting rural livelihood diversification. 
There is a need to promote rural livelihood diversification through extensive programmes focusing on 
the rural workforce that is increasingly shifting away from agriculture, and is in search of alternative 
livelihoods. For such populations, there is a need to introduce technical and vocational training 
programmes, with a particular focus on rural women. 
 
4. Strengthening social safety programmes, access to health/education services, and 
investments in climate-resilient infrastructure. 
The underlying causes of rural vulnerability need to be rooted out by strengthening social safety 
programmes that target poverty reduction, boost food security, and social equality in rural areas, with 
a particular focus on vulnerable groups, such as women. There is also a need for improvements in 
access to health and education services, in addition to investments in climate-resilient infrastructure.  
 
5. Improving rural fiscal resilience. 
Rural areas need to be provided institutional support for improved fiscal resilience. Migrant 
households could be given advisory support, for example, about where to invest their remittances in a 
way that can enhance both resilience and livelihoods. Efforts should be made to improve access to 
formal channels of credit to rural communities, especially small and subsistence farmers, because 
such access is critical for rural households in adapting to climate change and coping during climate 
disasters and duress.  
 
6. Enhancing service and delivery of agricultural extension programmes. 
Rural support for climate adaptation should also aim to improve service and delivery of rural 
agricultural extension programmes. The Government should start initiatives that support small 
farmers’ market linkages, access to credit, technology, and livelihood-relevant climate knowledge.  
Section I: Introduction 
Over the past three decades, there has been increasing research on anthropogenic climate change and 
its impacts on human societies. Climatic variability and change are expected to affect human and 
natural systems in the future as they have done so in the past (Adger et al. 2009; Adger et al. 2003). 
However, cross-regional and cross-scalar inquiries suggest that the frequency, intensity, and 
variability of climate-related events is increasing, and the consequent effects would, therefore, also be 
more severe (IPCC 2014). In rural areas, where livelihoods and economic activities are climate-
sensitive, these impacts are more pronounced, ranging from seasonal or sporadic disruption of 
agricultural activities to the physical displacement of entire communities. However, between minor 
manageable disruptions, and rendering habitats uninhabitable, there lies a spectrum of impacts that 
communities are constantly negotiating with and adapting to. These adaptations can be ‘autonomous’2 
or ‘planned’.3 
 
One of the more common ‘autonomous’ strategies for adapting to climate change is out-migration 
from vulnerable rural areas into urban or peri-urban areas. This, in many ways, is both a direct 
adaptation action as it minimises physical exposure, and is also a gateway to other strategies for 
building resilience such as diversifying sources of income and getting access to more information 
(Geddes and Jordan 2012; Black et al. 2011a). However, the relationship between climate change and 
migration is not linear (McLeman and Smit 2006; Mueller et al. 2014), and is dependent on a 
multitude of causation factors (Black and Sward 2009; Black et al. 2011b; Barnett and Adger 2007; 
Banerjee et al. 2011). Observed, experienced and anticipated changes in climate patterns influence the 
decision to migrate in conjunction with economic, socio-cultural, and political factors that are 
embedded within human contexts (Black et al. 2011b; Brown 2008).  
 
Scientific studies on the migration-climate nexus indicate that climatic and environmental variables 
affect migration outcomes through slow-onset changes (such as sea-level rise, global temperature rise, 
desertification and salinization of agricultural land, etc.), and sudden climatic events (such as floods, 
cyclones, droughts, and heat waves) (Otto et al. 2017). As communities and households are exposed 
to such slow-onset or sudden climatic events and associated risks, they respond by adjusting or 
adapting so as to avoid or overcome negative outcomes and vulnerabilities (Barnett and Chamberlain 
2010).4 In this light, migration may be seen as one out of a set of potential responses by households 
for adaptation (McLeman and Hunter 2010).  
 
Generally speaking, migration as an adaptation strategy brings benefits for the migrants as well as the 
migrant-sending households and communities. It enhances living standards in migrant-sending areas 
through the inflow of remittances, expansion of migratory networks, and improvements in human 
capital (health, education, skills, and knowledge). Transfer and diffusion of knowledge and skills 
contribute to the anticipatory capacity of households (Qaisrani et al. 2017), whereas expansion of 
social networks can be a buffer during climate disasters and stresses (Barnett and Chamberlain 2010). 
Migrants, in this sense, can be seen as agents of change that can help build resilience in migrant-
sending communities (Salik et al. 2017). 
 
It has also been found that communities which receive migrants stand to benefit from the influx of 
labour, increase in diversity and economic activity. However, this is contentious as this influx can also 
increase competition for jobs, put a burden on shared resources and utilities, and create or reinforce 
identity-driven conflict. Even in the case of migrants and their communities of origin, there are some 
limitations that need to be considered, e.g., factors that limit the ability to migrate, such as poverty, 
gender, and disabilities.  These pros and cons preclude the possibility of unequivocal and definitive 
answers to whether migration is an adaptive strategy for communities vulnerable to climate change; 
                                                            
2 Adaptation which does not constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli, but is triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by the market or welfare changes in human 
systems. 
3 Adaptation which is the result of a deliberate policy decision, based on an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that action is required to return to, maintain, 
or achieve a desired state. 
4 Adaptation to climate change is increasingly defined by a number of terms with varying meanings, such as adaptive capacity, vulnerability, exposure, sensitivity, and resilience (Porter 
and Davoudi 2012). The IPCC defines adaptation as ‘the process of adjustment [in human and natural systems] to actual or expected climate and its effects… that seeks to moderate or 
avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC 2014, Annex II:118). In other words, adaptation to climate change implies that people adopt a response that seeks to adjust to, or 
avoid, undesirable circumstances or outcomes so that they are not worse off than they started (Barnett and Chamberlain 2010). 
and, what are its key drivers and determinants, without first undertaking a structured investigation of 
areas that are vulnerable to climate change.  
 
Two research consortia – HI-AWARE and PRISE – undertook structured investigations on the above 
issues. This synthesis paper analyses the findings of the studies to understand the linkages between 
migration and climate change, and through this understanding, answer how migration contributes to 
adaptation at the household level in rural communities vulnerable to climatic impacts and risks. 
 
The theoretical background of this synthesis work is rooted in the New Economics of Labour Migration 
(NELM) school of thought. It places central importance on 
the household as a decision-making unit that engages in 
migration as a risk-sharing strategy to maximise and diversify 
income, minimise and spread risk, and overcome market 
constraints (De Haas 2010).  
 
Using evidence collected from socio-ecologically diverse 
regions of Pakistan, case studies are introduced from rural 
areas of eight districts in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KPK), and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Based on these, the study 
considers the livelihood vulnerabilities faced by rural 
communities and the coping/adaptive strategies that 
households adopt to reduce vulnerability to risks. Drivers of 
migration in these communities are also analysed to better understand the channels through which 
climatic (and non-climatic) factors affect migration. Confirming the affirmative role of migration in 
building adaptive capacities and household resilience, the review concludes by summarising lessons 
learned and proposing key policy recommendations that aim to support migration as an effective 
adaptation strategy against external shocks in national and sub-national policy circles.  
Migration is a means to secure and 
improve livelihoods, and promote 
investments so as to acquire a broad 
range of assets that can insure against 
future shocks. It is, thus, seen as an 
enabling strategy for households to 
become resilient to climate change by 
minimising risks to incomes, 
diversifying livelihoods, buffering 
against shocks, and improving 
socioeconomic indicators such as 
poverty, food security, education and 
health (De Haas 2010). 
 
Section II: Research context 
The following section provides an overview of climate and development trends across Pakistan. 
Locally available data specific to the study sites is limited and sparse. Hence, regional trends have 
been summarised where data is available on semi-arid plains and UIB, along with a review of national 
trends.  
 
Pakistan is a lower middle income country with a population of about 208 million people5 (PBS 2017; 
The World Bank 2018). The services sector is a major contributor to the national Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), followed by industries and the agricultural sector. Presently, agriculture contributes 
about 19.5% to the national GDP, and employs 43.4% of the total population (GoP 2017). Over the 
past few decades, the agriculture sector’s role in the economy has gradually declined, as has its 
employment share, yet a large proportion of the rural population (which makes up 64% of the total 
population) is still engaged in this sector (PBS 2017).  
 
Table 1: Pakistan’s performance in major development indicators 
 
Pakistan’s climate is predominantly arid to 
semi-arid. In the upper to middle reaches of 
the country, the climate varies from arid, 
semi-arid and temperate sub-humid, to alpine 
in the mountainous areas of the north (FAO 
and Aquastat 2011). Average annual 
precipitation varies greatly between 100-
500mm in arid to semi-arid zones, to 
2000mm on highlands (Ibid.). Generally, 
precipitation is low and erratic in the Upper 
and Middle Indus Basin with frequent 
extreme events. In the plains, rainfalls occur 
during the monsoon season (July-September). 
Flooding is, thus, a common and recurring 
problem along the floodplains of the Indus 
Basin during the monsoon. This has a 
dramatic impact on agriculture, livestock, 
water and other key sectors of the economy. 
 
Over the past decades, changing rainfall 
patterns and temperature fluctuations have increased difficulties for those engaged in agriculture and 
rural livelihoods – particularly subsistence farmers and the landless. As a result, food insecurity and 
poverty are major rural issues in Upper and Middle Indus Basin, the underlying causes of which are 
rooted in the heavy livelihood dependency on natural resource-based sectors, such as agriculture, 
livestock and forestry. Rural peoples’ vulnerability is further exacerbated due to high 
multidimensional poverty (see Fig. 1), low human development, environmental, and service delivery 
standards. Poor governance and low penetration of Social Protection Programmes (SPPs) further 
intensify vulnerabilities, and create incentives for rural livelihood diversification.  
                                                            
5 Based on the provisional results of the 6th Population and Housing Census of Pakistan 2017. The provisional results do not include the population of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). 
Development Indicator 2016 
GDP USD 283.7 billion 
GDP per capita  USD 1,468 
Total population 207.8 million (2017) 
Rural population (% of 
total) 
63.6% (or 132.2 
million) (2017) 
Employment in agriculture  
(% of total employment) 
43.5% 
Total unemployment rate  
(of total labour force) 
5.4% 
Human Development Index 
(HDI) 
0.538 (Ranks 147th) 
Population in 
Multidimensional Poverty 
45.6% of total 
Working poor at PPP USD 
3.1/day 
37.1% of total 
employed 
Global Hunger Index (GHI 
2015) 
33.9 (serious) 







Figure 1: Rural-urban multidimensional poverty in Pakistan 
 
Therefore, it is no surprise that a 
proportion of the rural population 
has been adapting by shifting 
livelihoods away from the 
agriculture sector, and in some 
cases, moving to urban areas 
altogether. While there are limited 
studies in Pakistan on the 
phenomenon of rural-to-urban 
migration as an adaptation 
response to climate change, this 
synthesis paper is an attempt at 
filling this literature gap. 
 
 
Source: GoP and UNDP (2016). 
 
Past observed changes in various meteorological parameters over Pakistan indicate that the climate is 
gradually changing. Over the last century, the average annual temperature has risen by 0.6°C, and 
annual precipitation has increased by 25% (Sheikh et al. 2009). Most of the warming trend over the 
country has been due to a rise in winter temperature, but the central parts of Pakistan have also seen a 
significant rise in minimum summer temperatures (ADB 2017). A study published in Nature by 
Treydte et al. (2006) concluded that the 20th century was the wettest in a millennium in the area now 
constituting northern Pakistan, and most of the precipitation coincided with the period of 
industrialisation and global warming (i.e., late 1800s onwards). In the monsoon belt, summer rainfall 
increased by 18-32% during 1901-2000, whereas northern areas outside the monsoon belt experienced 
expanding aridity during the same period (ADB 2017). Other areas, such as the northern mountains, 
have experienced a decline in summer rainfall in recent decades (Hussain et al. 2005; Fowler and 
Archer 2006), along with a trend of warming in winter (Khattak et al. 2011; Fowler and Archer 2006), 
and cooling in summer (Fowler and Archer 2006). Across the country, heat wave days per annum 
increased by 31 days during 1980-2007 (ADB 2017). 
 
Consistent with past trends, future climate projections show that annual mean temperature is expected 
to continue rising by 2-3°C, which is higher than the projected global average (Saeed et al. 2016; GoP 
and UNEP 2013). The northern parts of the country are expected to experience higher temperature 
rise by 2080 as compared to the southern areas (Ibid.). The mean annual precipitation in both northern 
and southern Pakistan is forecasted to increase in summer, and decrease in winter with no significant 
change in average annual rainfall (Islam et al. 2009). The occurrence of hot days and hot nights is 
expected to significantly increase (ADB 2017). With such changes, there is also an increased 
likelihood of occurrence of extreme climatic events (like heat waves, floods, Glacial Lake Outburst 
Floods [GLOFs], droughts, etc.) as has happened in the past.  
 
As climatic patterns continue to change, their consequences will be felt on critical sectors such as 
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Salik 2018). These impacts will be felt by rural communities given their heavy reliance on natural 
capital-based livelihoods (IPCC 2014). Generally, rural areas are expected to experience shifts in 
water and food security, agricultural incomes and changes in productive lands (Ibid.). They may, thus, 
experience rise in environmental risks associated with rural incomes, a decline in livelihood 
opportunities, and greater stress on social institutions (Agrawal 2008). Rural communities in 
mountainous regions are exceptionally vulnerable given the higher exposure to natural hazards such 
as flash floods, landslides, GLOFs, etc., and their increased sensitivity due to lack of adequate 
services and development work (IPCC 2014; IPCC 2013; Messerli et al. 2004). Development 
interventions in mountainous regions are subject to unique logistical challenges due to the terrain and 
topography. This limitation also affects attempts to scale up or expand adaptation solutions.  
 
Extreme climatic events over the past decade in northern and central regions of Pakistan have exposed 
them to external shocks that have resulted in human disasters with serious socioeconomic 
consequences. For example, during the 2015 floods, more than 100,000 rural residents in Dera Ghazi 
Khan (D.G. Khan) were displaced, while almost 500,000 acres of land surrounding 453 villages was 
destroyed (The Express Tribune 2015). Similarly, the 2010 Lake Attabad landslide, that blocked 
Hunza River following a massive snowstorm in mountainous region of GB permanently, displaced 




The environmental vulnerabilities that communities face in these regions are aggravated by the socio-
political and economic vulnerabilities that further erode their adaptive capacities. Among other 
developmental deficits, the UIB and semi-arid plains face similar challenges of food insecurity, 
poverty, inadequate public amenities and limited employment opportunities in rural areas. To reduce 
their exposure to economic and environmental risks, a number of rural households within these 
regions adapt by sending a member of the household to urban centres to add to household incomes 
(Saeed et al. 2016). Migration is, in fact, a common household strategy in the mountainous region of 
UIB (Milan et al. 2015; Gioli et al. 2014) and semi-arid areas of Punjab and KPK (Salik et al. 2017). 
According to some estimates, rural-to-urban migration constitutes up to 40% of internal migration in 
Pakistan (Arif 2005). 
 
Studies investigating the migration-climate nexus conclude that there is indeed a fine correlation 
between climatic variables (such as heat and water stress), and migration decisions in rural areas 
(Qaisrani et al. 2017; Saeed et al. 2016; Mueller et al. 2014; Sattar 2013). Migration is used as a 
strategy not just to adapt households to climate shocks, but also to adjust and adapt to non-climatic 
Table 2: Damage from floods in Pakistan (2010-17) 








2010 20 million 2,000+ 17,553 20% of total land area submerged underwater 10 billion 
2011 9.2 million 500+ 38,700 2.2 million acre crop area in Sindh and Balochistan 3.7 billion 
2012 4.85 million 571 14,159 
1.17 million acre crop 
area 2.6 billion 
2013 1.5 million 333 8,297 1.11 million acre crop area 2 billion 
2014 2.6 million 367 4,065 2.42 million acre crop area 0.5 billion 
2015 1.9 million 238 4634 0.7 million acre land  170 million 
2016 NA 424 45+ 4381 houses damaged 6 million+ 
2017 NA 164 NA 440 houses damaged NA 
Source: Various versions of NDMA and FFC annual reports, GoP. 
Note: NA – Not available. 
stresses, such as economic and socio-political duress (Salik et al. 2017; Gioli et al. 2014; Ishaq, 
Ahmed and Saeed, unpublished). Through migration, rural households diversify their income, 
improve human capital and socioeconomic status. Thus, migration indirectly plays a role in not just 
increasing adaptation and resilience of households, but also improving development outcomes, such 
as through poverty alleviation (Irfan 2011). 
 
Despite the positive trend of rural-to-urban migration across Pakistan, the issue of migration (and 
migration-climate nexus) receives limited governmental support or recognition in national policy 
circles (Ishfaq et al. 2017). Existing policy discourse on migration is limited to international 
migration. The National Emigration Policy (2013) is one such example. Through increased 
regularisation and facilitation, the policy seeks to tap into the benefits that accrue from overseas 
emigration. However, it does not propose measures to reap into the direct and indirect benefits that 
local communities enjoy as a result of internal migration (much of which is rural-to-urban). The 
financial gains (of internal migration) to sending communities are often unaccounted in official 
documents, because of which their role in the national economy is overlooked. 
 
Moreover, migration links are disconnected from both development and climate change adaptation 
policies and plans. For instance, the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) is mostly silent on 
rural-to-urban migration, but where it does speak, it proposes measures to ‘curb’, ‘check’ or 
‘discourage’ it (GoP 2013: 77; GoP 2012: 26). Additionally, there is limited government intervention 
in providing formal corridors for adaptation support, even as local communities adapt their lives and 
livelihoods to changes in the local environment. Government support is visible in areas previously 
hard-hit by climatic disasters (such as D.G. Khan that was devastated by recurrent floods of 2010, 
2012, 2013 and 2015). However, overall support in other vulnerable areas is missing, despite the 
existence of an overarching policy framework for adaptation, such as the NCCP, Framework for 
Implementation of NCCP, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), etc.).  
 
It is important to learn from other developing countries that face climate vulnerabilities, like 
Bangladesh and Ethiopia, who have officially embraced migration as an adaptation response to 
climate change in their National Adaptation Plans of Action (Banerjee et al. 2011). Based on the 
expanding research evidence on rural migration as an enabling adaptation strategy, the government 
needs to harmonise existing policies and plans based on the migration-climate nexus, as well as 
transform relevant policy pledges into concrete actions, especially considering that migration as a 
livelihood diversification and adaptation strategy is a prominent rural trend. 
 
2.1. Research methodology 
This paper synthesises research findings of two independent studies carried out in Pakistan under the 
Collaborative Adaptation Research Initiative in Africa and Asia (CARIAA) programme. The 
Pathways to Resilience in Semi-arid Economies (PRISE) project was focused on semi-arid plains, 
which was led by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan. The Himalayan 
Adaptation, Water and Resilience (HI-AWARE) project carried out research in Pakistan on the UIB, 
which was led by Climate Change, Alternative Energy, and Water Resources Institute of the Pakistan 
Agricultural Research Council (CAEWRI-PARC) and Leadership for Environment and Development 
(LEAD) Pakistan.  
 
Specific rural sites were selected within eight districts. PRISE case studies were carried out in rural 
areas of Faisalabad and D.G Khan in Punjab, and Mardan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). For HI-
AWARE, rural areas of Hunza and Nagar in GB, and Sargodha, Rawalpindi and Chakwal in rural 
Punjab were selected.  
 
Geographically speaking, both semi-arid areas and UIB refer to the same geographical locale, with the 
exception of a few regions. Parts of semi-arid areas lie in the UIB, but not the entire Basin is semi-
arid, particularly the alpine and mountainous terrains. Moreover, some of the study sites lie in Middle 
Indus Basin (such as D.G. Khan and Sargodha). Thus, this synthesis work refers to the two study 
areas as PRISE and HI-AWARE study sites, instead of semi-arid and/or UIB. 
 
Figure 2: Aridity map of Pakistan showing Upper and Middle Indus Basins  
(based on PMD Station data from 1990 – 2010)6 
 
Source: Pakistan Meteorological Department (2000), courtesy of Dr Bashir Ahmed, Climate Change 
and Geo-Informatics Programme Leader, CAEWRI-PARC. 
 
The research sites are predominantly rural, and were selected based on a three-point criterion:  
 
(i) exposure to climatic/environmental hazards and extreme events in recent years;  
(ii) stakeholder identification/recommendation;  
(iii) presence of local partners to aid in site access, identification and research facilitation. 
 
The data was collected in 2016 and 2017. The sample size for the PRISE study was 600 households, 
whereas the sample population for the HI-AWARE study was 419 households. Based on their 
responses to questions about migration status, respondent households were categorised into migrant, 
and non-migrant households by the research teams. A migrant household was defined as a rural 
household that had at least one member who had recently out-migrated internally or internationally.7 
Generally speaking, perspectives of migrant households excluded viewpoints of migrants themselves 
as they were not present at the time of the survey.8 Non-migrant households were those that did not 
have any migrant member.  
 
A mix of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), gender-disaggregated Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), 
and household questionnaires were used to collect quantitative and qualitative data. The research 
questionnaires differed for both projects’ study sites, as they were drafted and collected by different 
project teams lead by SDPI for PRISE and CAEWRI-PARC for HI-AWARE.9 However, common 
research themes and data were consolidated after fieldwork and migration-related research findings 
were synthesised for the Upper and Middle Indus Basin, upstream of Sindh and Balochistan provinces 
in Pakistan. 
 
                                                            
6 Upper and Middle Indus Basins are arbitrarily defined by the authors, based on geological maps. 
7 For PRISE, migrant households were those who had a household member who had out-migrated in the last three months, whereas for HI-AWARE, migrant households were those whose 
migrant member had out-migrated for at least three months in the past one year. 
8 While it would have been ideal to capture perspectives of the migrants and their host communities, the time, scope and cost constraints made this a research limitation. This study also 
excludes viewpoints of migrant households in which all members of the household out-migrated. 
9 Given the large sample size, and field survey limitations, some parts of the sample were missing or not collected, and were omitted from analysis of the data sets. 
The results section of this synthesis draws from datasets of both PRISE and HI-AWARE. For findings 
related to PRISE research, the next section also draws from two earlier publications by PRISE-SDPI: 
i.e., Salik et al, (2017), and Qaisrani et al. (2017). 
 
2.2. Strengths and limitations of the analysis 
The purpose of this synthesis is to highlight the role of migration in the adaptation context under 
different climatic and agro-ecological zones. However, drawing a true parallel between the two 
research studies is not possible because of the differences in research goals and objectives, scope, and 
research methodology, including differences in data collection, sample size, research questions and 
questionnaires. Even the definition of migration was different for the two project teams. However, 
there were many commonalities on the basis of which similar trends were drawn. Based on the data 
available, this synthesis offers insights on determinants of migration, followed by an analysis and 
discussion of how migration contributes to rural adaptation to climate change under different regional 
contexts.  
  
Section III: Key synthesis findings  
 
This section briefly explores rural communities’ observation of environmental changes and their 
implications for rural livelihoods, followed by a synopsis of contemporary adaptation practises used 
by rural communities to overcome livelihood vulnerability to external risks and shocks. With a brief 
reference to drivers of migratory movement within national borders, a discussion follows on 
migration as an enabling adaptation strategy.10 
 
3.1. Climatic change and livelihood vulnerability 11 
Given their primary dependence on agriculture, livestock and forestry sectors, rural economies in 
Upper to Middle Indus Basin areas are increasingly vulnerable to climate change. This research finds 
that farmers are cognizant of the changes in the environment and climate that indirectly and directly 
affect rural livelihoods.  Despite limited access to scientific knowledge, rural households surveyed by 
PRISE teams in semi-arid plains noted a gradual: 
 
(i) decrease in rainfall, 
(ii) rise in temperatures, and, 
(iii) change in the number of hot and cold days during winter and summer seasons.  
 
Rural communities surveyed under HI-AWARE reported:  
 
(i) a rise in erratic rainfall, 
(ii) decrease in winter precipitation, and,  
(iii) increase in frequency of flash floods.  
 
Interestingly, migrant households in both PRISE and HI-AWARE sites were more perceptive of these 
changes compared to non-migrant households, making them more likely to timely respond to such 
changes in an effective manner. Similar to the semi-arid areas studied under PRISE, the UIB areas 
under HI-AWARE are predominantly agriculture dependent, with the upstream areas of Hunza and 
Nagar also relying on forestry. Farming households surveyed under HI-AWARE perceived 
environmental and climatic change in terms of their impacts on rural livelihoods. For example, 
farmers reported a change in environmental conditions, by giving evidence of the rise in pest and 
weed attacks, degradation of pasture lands and decrease in crop yields. Rural households surveyed 
under PRISE reported similar livelihood vulnerabilities, that included complete crop failure 
(especially for D.G. Khan that has been affected by recurrent floods), decline in crop yields, spread of 
contaminated water, and heat-related and water-borne diseases that affected the number of work days 




                                                            
10 When addressing questions related to long-term migration, the study does not distinguish between temporary migration (lasting ten years, for example) and permanent migration (lasting 
a lifetime). 
11 HI-AWARE results in this section are based upon data from upstream areas only since at the time of writing this paper, data on mid- and downstream UIB sites was not accessible. 
Figure 3: Livelihood vulnerability reported by PRISE farmers due to climate change 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
3.2. Adaptive measures to reduce livelihood vulnerability to climatic risks 
The study sites were primarily reliant on natural resource-based sectors. Hence, the focus was on 
understanding how farmers were adapting their resource-dependent livelihoods to shocks and stresses 
(particularly climate change). To overcome vulnerabilities and risks posed to rural livelihoods, 
households reported a number of adaptive measures that they took against climatic and non-climatic 
risks. These are shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
 
To deal with slow-onset climate change, farmers surveyed under PRISE commonly resorted to 
intensifying farm inputs (45%), such as fertilisers and pesticides to increase farm incomes. They also 
reported diversifying crop varieties (27%). The third most common adaptation strategy against 
climate change was to encourage and support migration of at least one member of the household. It is 
important to note here that given the highly patriarchal culture dominant in rural areas, it was usually 
always a male family member who was encouraged and supported to migrate. Only in the case of 
Faisalabad did villagers report supporting female household members to migrate to urban areas (4% 
of households). Other adaptation techniques that farmers generally employed in PRISE study sites 
were the increased mechanisation of agriculture through use of (more) machines and labour (6%); 
improved on-farm water infrastructure (5%); and in some cases a shift away from agriculture as a 
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Figure 4: Major adaptation practices adopted by PRISE farmers 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
 
In areas surveyed by HI-AWARE, the agricultural adaptation strategies most frequently used by 
households were the introduction of new crop varieties (36%), followed by changes in cropping cycle 
and pattern (32%); improvements in harvesting systems (28%); and improvements in irrigation 
system (24%). Almost a fifth (18.2%) of the farmers engaged in agriculture reported shifting away to 
non-farm livelihood activities. Some households adopted up to seven adaptation practices at a time. 
Figure 5 highlights the type of adaptation measures taken at the household level: 
 
Figure 5: Major adaptation practices adopted by HI-AWARE farmers
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Farmers in HI-AWARE sites complemented adaptation measures in agriculture by undertaking 
practices in the forestry, livestock and water sectors. In the livestock sector, these included 
improvements in animal shed/ponds (56%), investments to counter pests and disease (48%), and a 
shift away to non-farm activities (35.4%). Of those engaged in the water and forestry sectors, major 
adaptation practices were rehabilitation of degraded lands (55%) and investments in maintenance and 
protection of water sources (56%). 
 
Interestingly, some households in both regions (between 6-14%) reported that they did not adapt to 
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how and information on how to adapt, or did not have the means or resources to adapt their economic 
activities, given the reportedly high cost of adaptation.  
 
3.3. Public and private adaptation support schemes 
Reported government support provided in semi-arid plains under PRISE varied from provision of 
subsidies, credit, and/or insurance and new seed varieties, to early warning systems and capacity 
building programmes. Respondents in Punjab (D.G. Khan and Faisalabad) reported receiving some 
level of government support, whereas respondents in KPK (Mardan) recounted that there was no 
known government-provided adaptation facility/programme. Even though the local public 
departments countered this claim, it goes to show the lack of penetration of public schemes in some 
areas. 
 
Access to insurance schemes and/or ‘external support’ was reported in HI-AWARE study areas of 
UIB. Even though many households were beneficiaries of life and health insurance, it cannot be 
assumed as a proxy for government support or expansion of public financial infrastructure. A few 
households also owned livestock insurance, which included coverage in case livestock was hunted by 
predators (such as the snow leopard in uplands of Hunza and Nagar). 
 
3.4. Drivers and determinants of migration 
To help understand the role of migration in household adaptation and resilience-building, this review 
has tried to delineate the underlying causation factors that affect migratory outcomes in upper and 
middle areas of Pakistan. For ease of understanding, drivers of migration that generally cut across 
spatial and temporal dimensions are classified into economic, political, social and environmental 
spheres (UN n.d.; Geddes and Jordan 2012; Black et al. 2011a&b). 
 
Consistent with national and international literature, migratory decisions were shown to be an 
outcome of a complex interplay of causation factors (Mazumdar 1987; Etzo 2008; Kolev 2013) in 
both PRISE and HI-AWARE study sites.12 These are presented in Figures 6a, 6b and 7. 
 
Internal migration in PRISE study sites was shown to be predominantly driven by economic factors 
that were rooted in both places of origin and destination. These included aspects such as better 
employment prospects in urban centres (81%); inadequate job opportunities in rural settings (71%); 
and dissatisfaction with present rural livelihoods (45%). Wage differential between urban and rural 
labour markets, better opportunities for income diversification and small-business investment in urban 
centres also seemed to be persuasive factors for migratory decisions (Salik et al. 2017). Similarly, 
most migrants within HI-AWARE study areas migrated for a combination of reasons, but the most 
commonly cited factors related to employment opportunities (48%). More importantly, 57% of 
migrant households reported that the migrant was gainfully employed in full-time work at the time of 
migration. If those that were self-employed or employed as part-time workers are included, the 
proportion increases to 81%. This suggests that there was discontentment with the existing means of 
rural income as compared to opportunities for employment in the destination area. This differential, 
which is also witnessed in semi-arid areas, served as a driver for out-migration.  
  
                                                            
12 Respondents in both studies selected multiple reasons. Therefore, those that stated one reason for migration did not do so exclusively. The respondents were not migrants themselves, but 
members of their households (in places of origin). Hence, the responses capture perceptions about drivers and determinants of migration from the perspectives of migrant households. 
Figure 6a: Reasons for rural out-migration as reported by HI-AWARE respondents 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Figure 7: Reasons for rural out-migration as reported by PRISE respondents 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
 
Social drivers of migration were the second most important reasons after economic drivers.13 More 
than 50% respondents in the PRISE semi-arid study areas reported that better living standards in 
urban municipalities and food insecurity in rural settlements were reasons for migration. They also 
cited inadequate education (48%) and health (43%) services in rural areas as a driver of out-migration. 
In HI-AWARE study areas (UIB), education was the second most frequently cited reason (23%) for 
migrating, after employment opportunities.  
 
While the drive to improve human capital was similar for migrants from both study areas, the value 
attached to migratory social networks was different. In the semi-arid plains, a significant social 
determinant of migration was access to existing social networks in places of destination (for more 
than one-third of the households surveyed). Advice from migrant relatives and friends played a 
critical role in migratory decisions in these areas, but less than 4% respondents in UIB surveyed by 
HI-AWARE stated that family members or friends in the destination area influenced their decision to 
migrate.  
 
Political drivers also play an influential role in migratory decisions (Geddes and Jordan 2012). In 
Faisalabad, dissatisfaction with imperfect inheritance laws (concerning landownership) compelled 
some (25%) to out-migrate.14 Similarly, in Sargodha, 5% reported landlessness and/or low 
landholdings as a driver of migration. In rural Mardan, underdevelopment, wide disparities in income 
and opportunity, and lack of institutional support seemed to be the underlying factors prompting many 
non-farming household members to migrate to nearby urban centres.  
 
Even though remote mountain areas are assumed to be more problematic when it comes to property 
rights and tenure arrangements, respondents from migrant households of Hunza and Nagar did not 
consider it an influence on the decision to migrate, as only 2% stated that as a reason. However, one 
                                                            
13 By social drivers, we refer to both social capital – social identity-based networks – and human capital – a function of skills, knowledge, education, health and personal attributes, etc. 
14 It is not clear whether it was just the existence of imperfect laws that compelled them to move, or whether they were the unfortunate victims of these laws who were forced to leave after 
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must be cautious when drawing inferences from this as eviction stemming from legal, informal, or 
violent land disputes tends to displace the entire household and not just selected individuals. As with 
semi-arid areas, in the UIB region, the respondents were households who had one or more migrant 
members, thus, excluding the above category of migrants from the study.  
 
Environmental drivers affect migration in combination with political, economic and social drivers 
(Black et al. 2011a). Among other influences, migrant households reported that declining crop 
productivity, complete harvest failure, water contamination, and pest attacks were some of the factors 
that impelled them to diversify incomes. As a result, 7% of farmer respondents in PRISE areas shifted 
to livelihoods other than agriculture, while 12% farmers engaged in climate-related migration. While 
the HI-AWARE study does not directly capture environmental drivers of migration, it can be 
concluded from the results that erratic rainfalls, increased frequency of climatic extremes affected 
agricultural incomes as 18% farmers in agriculture, and 35% respondents in the livestock sector in 
UIB reported a shift towards non-farm activities. Although data is not available, one can presume that 
at least some members from this group who shifted to non-farm activities later opt to diversify income 
through out-migration. 
 
3.5. Migration as an adaptation strategy 
In the PRISE survey, rural out-migration was most common among respondent households in D.G. 
Khan (more than 50%), followed by Mardan (38%) and Faisalabad (30%). In the HI-AWARE 
research, upstream areas of Hunza and Nagar had the highest proportion of migrant households 
(46%), compared to Sargodha (21%) and mid-stream areas of Rawalpindi and Chakwal (26%).  
 
Environmental disasters and climate extreme events (such as floods, extreme rainfall, landslides, 
GLOFs, heat waves, etc.) had displaced a significant proportion of rural populations in recent years. 
In the HI-AWARE study area, 16% respondent households had been displaced due to natural hazards 
in the past ten years. Of these, respondents in downstream (Sargodha, 21%) and upstream areas 
(Hunza and Nagar, 22%) were the worse affected, compared to midstream areas (Rawalpindi and 
Chakwal, 4.5%). Migrant households were as susceptible to climate-induced displacement as non-
migrant households (18% and 16%, respectively). They, however, reported greater losses in property 
compared to non-migrants due to climate extreme events. In the case of PRISE, displacement due to 
climate hazards was the highest in D.G. Khan (88%).15 Despite high exposure to recurrent climate 
disasters in the last five years, most of the farmer households temporarily displaced in D.G. Khan 
returned upon recession of flood waters. Respondent households in all study sites reported losses in 
income, property and livestock as a result of climate disasters over the past 5-10 years. Some even 
reported loss of human life. 
 
In semi-arid regions studied under PRISE, it normally cost anywhere from PKR 10,000-100,000 
(about USD 86-864) to move to a town/city, according to respondent estimates. In UIB surveyed 
under HI-AWARE, the average cost of migration per migrant ranged from PKR 30,000-200,000 
(USD 280-1800). However, for households that received remittances, the average remittance amount 
of PKR 10,000 (USD 92) per month in UIB made it cost effective for the household to sponsor or 
financially support migration. A quarter of migrant remittances were consumed to cope with climate 
disasters in HI-AWARE sites; whereas in PRISE areas, 30-40% of migrant remittances were used to 
purchase food.  
 
Generally, migration seems to be associated with socioeconomic rural issues. For example, in UIB, 
migration for better work opportunities was highest in Rawalpindi and Chakwal, and lowest in 
upstream areas of Hunza and Nagar. Unemployment rate was lowest in the midstream areas 
(Rawalpindi and Chakwal) which had high labour migration rates, while it was highest in Hunza and 
Nagar.  
 
                                                            
15 This figure is for respondent households engaged in the agriculture sector only. Values for households displaced in other PRISE sites is not available. 
Much like the PRISE study area, the experience of migration was highly gendered and male-
dominated in UIB. Only 6% of the migrants from this study region were female, and they were all 
from the upstream area of Hunza and Nagar. This is not surprising as these mountain areas are known 
for higher stress on female education and employment compared to other rural areas of Pakistan. 
Anecdotal accounts from the region suggest that this 6% is a gross underrepresentation of female 
migration patterns as households prefer not to report or discuss female migrants.  There was 
negligible female labour migration in Rawalpindi, Chakwal, and Sargodha. Likewise, PRISE study 
sites also showed negligible female migration, except for marriage. Out-migration of male household 
members also shifted more responsibilities upon females, who had to undertake additional household 
chores in addition to childcare and housekeeping.   
Section IV: Discussion  
Results from the PRISE and HI-AWARE studies indicate that changes in rural livelihoods, and their 
impact on household food security, has slowly shifted economic reliance away from the agriculture 
sector. Depending on household and regional differences, anywhere from 20-50% rural households 
reported financially supporting migration of a household member. Once a household member 
migrated and their remittances started flowing in, reliance on agricultural incomes further declined, as 
post-migration, remittances are assumed to form a significant proportion of household revenues.16 In 
non-migrant households, livelihood dependence on a single sector (agriculture, livestock or forestry) 
aggravated livelihood sensitivity to climate risks, as a result of which many were forced to shift to 
non-farm activities.  
 
Migration is, however, more likely to originate in places that are exposed to rampant food insecurity, 
economic disparity and deprivation, and rural-urban market inequalities. A study carried out in 
Ethiopia by Ezra and Kiros (2001) found that migration was more rampant in communities where 
there was an increased perception of food insecurity, and the need for additional income so as to 
decrease livelihood vulnerability. While results from the HI-AWARE study do not conclusively point 
towards food insecurity as a key driver of migration, it appears to be a dominant influencer of 
migratory decisions in semi-arid plains studied under PRISE. Rural vulnerability in semi-arid areas 
intensified when food insecurity was paralleled by socioeconomic deprivation. The effect was not 
only further exposure to climatic and non-climatic risks, but also the erosion of rural incomes and 
adaptive capacities during shocks and stresses.  
 
An example of this can be found in the correlation between involuntary displacement and migration in 
both regions studied under PRISE and HI-AWARE. Places that experienced high levels of forced 
displacement were also associated with high migratory levels. D.G. Khan and Mardan had high 
exposure to climate disasters over the past eight years. They also exhibited higher levels of migration, 
compared to Faisalabad. Similarly, Hunza and Nagar, that were prone to climate and environmental 
hazards, also showed high levels of migration in the HI-AWARE sites. However, there were 
exceptions too, as Rawalpindi, Chakwal and Sargodha are at comparatively lower-risk to climate 
disasters (PDMA 2014), yet Rawalpindi and Chakwal had a higher proportion of migrants as 
compared to Sargodha. Overall, the experience of involuntary temporary resettlement seemed to 
predispose household members to seek out permanent alternative abodes in order to prevent similar 
displacement in the future. It is also reasonable to assume that the displacement of households in the 
vicinity would prompt some rural households to migrate to avoid a similar fate in the future. Hence, 
among other purposes, migration may be used as a means to adapt to future shocks.  
 
Results from both studies show that rural communities are increasingly perceptible of how climate 
change affects rural incomes and livelihoods. The majority took autonomous and diverse adaptive 
measures at the household level, such as change in cropping patterns and increased use of farm inputs. 
Yet, regardless of how well communities were adapting to slow-onset changes, they remained 
vulnerable to climate extremes. Climate hazards also affected people in spite of migration status of the 
household, as discussed above. In fact, losses incurred to migrants during disasters were reportedly 
higher than non-migrants. This implies that even if communities in hazard-prone areas continue to 
initiate and autonomously undertake adaptation measures against slow-onset climate change, they 
remain vulnerable and at risk of exposure to climate extremes, unless critical investments in climate-
resilient infrastructure are made at the community and governmental levels. A second implication that 
can be drawn from the link between climate hazards and increased out-migration is that climate and 
environmental change (and climate extremes as its proxy) plays some role in migration decisions. 
 
From the results, it appears that climate change may have acted as a ‘macro driver of many kinds of 
environmental changes’ that triggered shifts in environmental and biophysical conditions (Barnett and 
Adger 2007). A number of farmers reported shifting away from agriculture as a means to diversify 
income, when losses were incurred through decline in crop productivity, crop failure, degradation of 
                                                            
16 Based on household responses in PRISE areas; and average monthly remittance estimates of PKR 10,000 (USD 92) in HI-AWARE sites. 
pasturelands, water contamination, and pest attacks. Others adjusted livelihood practices in 
agriculture, livestock and forestry sector to adapt to a changed climate, as found in a similar study by 
Abid et al. (2016). In PRISE areas, 12% farmer households engaged in climate-related migration. This 
indicates that migration outcomes were shaped by complex environmental and climate factors that 
interacted with economic, socio-political and cultural factors (McLeman and Hunter 2010). 
 
So while environmental and climatic factors alone were important, they represented one set of 
migratory drivers. At the micro-level, the primary reason for migration was better work opportunities 
in urban areas and low wages in rural settlements. However, at the macro-scale rural out-migration 
seemed to be partly controlled by rural-urban market inequalities that were perpetuated by weak 
labour market institutions (Checchi and García-Peñalosa 2008). Many from the Upper and Middle 
Indus Basin also migrated to have better access to quality education and health services in urban 
areas. In the absence of efficient governance, development infrastructure and legal systems to support 
and protect the poor, rural inequality and marginalisation flourishes. As an outfall of this, many rural 
residents are pushed out to migrate to diversify their incomes and improve living standards.  
 
Just as the reasons for migration were varied, so were the benefits that accrued from out-migration to 
communities of migrant origin. Many of these benefits of migration flowed from remittances (Barnett 
and Chamberlain 2010). Remittances build household resilience by spreading risk and broadening 
opportunities for human well-being, such as through investments in human and physical capital 
(Adger et al. 2002; Adams and Adger 2013). Remittances can also help to buffer against climatic and 
non-climatic shocks. In UIB, about a quarter of the households surveyed used remittances to cope 
with extreme climatic events. In addition, remittances help meet basic consumption needs (such as 
food), as was found in the semi-arid regions. When put to productive use, remittances can help 
increase access to financial capital which can be used for investments in assets (agricultural land), and 
small businesses – thus, further increasing economic resilience of migrant households (Salik et al. 
2017).  
 
However, migration is not easy and comes at a cost. It is conditional upon access to adequate financial 
resources (Brown 2008), because permanent migration, particularly over long distances, entails heavy 
financial and social costs and hardship, which is usually pursued by only a minority of communities 
affected by climate risks and hazards (McLeman and Hunter 2010). Most households chose to stay or 
adapt in ways other than migration. Due to the hardship and heavy costs, migration in literature is 
reported to be a last resort adaptation option (Brown 2008; McLeman and Hunter 2010).  
 
Furthermore, migration may have differential impacts for different groups. For example, compared to 
poorer households that were ‘trapped’ and left out, wealthier households in PRISE areas that engaged 
in migration were more likely to offset climate risks, given their access to finances and social 
capital.17 Their ready access to credit/loans, and social networks, for example, helped during times of 
duress (such as floods) to cope with disaster relief and livelihood recovery. This has been shown in 
multi-country studies elsewhere, such as by Bryan et al. (2009) in South Africa and Ethiopia. 
Similarly, in a study on UIB, Gioli et al. (2014) concluded that the poorest and most vulnerable are 
often unable to choose migration as a coping strategy against climate change, because of limited 
access to financial resources. As a result, they become more vulnerable by dwelling in hazard-prone 
areas, and climate risks erode their coping capacities further (Klasen 2012 in Ishaq et al. unpublished). 
 
Migration also impacts female members of migrant households differently. As migrant households 
and communities become more economically viable, women within migrant households may, in fact, 
be negatively impacted (Kothari 2003 in Barnett and Webber 2010) and their adaptive capacity 
erodes, as they are burdened with additional household chores and responsibilities (such as looking 
after livestock) when male members migrate. This, however, needs further investigation, as the two 
studies did not adequately capture the differential impact of migration on left-behind female 
household members, given the different foci of the studies. While migration shifted power dynamics 
                                                            
17 See Salik et al. (2017) for more details. 
within households when the head migrated, most of the power associated with decision-making, 
resource allocation and access to remittances was reshuffled back to male members. Given the highly 
patriarchal culture, women were also excluded from opportunities for labour migration. In rural areas 
where there was negligible female labour migration, migration seemed to further entrench gender 
inequalities.  
Section V: Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
This synthesis presented findings from selected areas of Pakistan representing semi-arid plains (for 
the PRISE study) and UIB (for the HI-AWARE study) where climatic vulnerability is high and rural-
to-urban migration is a prominent trend. By synthesising results from the two studies, this paper 
shows that climate change is a reality in rural settlements, and villagers are increasingly perceptible of 
its risks. Most of those engaged in natural resource-based sectors are already undertaking adaptive 
measures in response to these changes. However, climate hazards and risks continue to 
indiscriminately affect rural residents regardless of household status and their level of adaptation. 
Moreover, slow-onset changes in the climate seem to drive macro changes in the environment, all of 
which ultimately interact with economic, social and political factors to determine migratory outcomes. 
Climate change is, thus, a threat-multiplier that exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and risks in 
important dimensions of sustainable development. 
 
As a consequence, migration is a common household strategy in rural areas to diversify income and 
minimise risk against shocks.  Coincidently, areas with high proportion of migrant households are 
also prone to climate and environmental hazards. As a result, a significant proportion of respondents 
had been displaced in the past, incurring human and monetary losses. During such duress, migrant 
remittances worked as a buffer against shocks and stresses (such as food insecurity, floods, heat 
waves, etc.). Where migration occurred, it was both costly and entailed hardships. Nevertheless, the 
appeal of additional household income in the form of remittances persuaded many to sponsor 
migration of a household member. Migration also appears to uplift the socioeconomic status of 
migrant households. However, not all household members benefitted equally from migration, as rural 
out-migration was male-dominated. Women were not only excluded from opportunities for labour 
migration, they also had to assume additional household responsibilities when male household 
members out-migrated. Overall, migration appeared to be an enabling coping strategy against risks 
and shocks in both study areas.  
 
As discussed in Section II, an important caveat to this synthesis work was its reliance on two 
independent methodologies, due to which true parallels were not possible. However, effort was made 
to draw out common trends in migration as an adaptation strategy in rural contexts. This work merits 
further investigation so that results could be further verified, for example, by replicating PRISE 
methodology in UIB areas. 
 
Adaptation decision-making within rural areas is the outcome of forces within the household, such as 
mitigation of risk to income loss; and outside the household, such as agricultural measures to provide 
new resistant crop varieties; or introduction of on-farm electricity subsidies (Smit and Skinner 2002). 
For climate change adaptation to be effective, it must be complemented by adaptation measures taken 
at all tiers of decision-making (i.e. household, local communities, and local and national government 
levels). Adaptation should be well-planned at the public policy level with well-thought benefits for 
rural and urban economies both of which are affected by internal migratory flows. More importantly, 
successful adaptation needs to adjust planning and decision-making systems with considerations for 
current and future climate change (Smit and Wandel 2006). This is increasingly important because 
rural households and communities in hazard-prone areas continue to remain vulnerable to climate and 
non-climatic shocks and stresses, despite engaging in self-initiated adaptation measures. Thus, critical 
investments need to be made in climate-resilient infrastructure in rural areas (like improving and 
enlarging road networks, improving irrigation networks and clean drinking water supplies, promoting 
efficient floodwater diversion and control during monsoon season, climate forecasting, effective 
disaster preparedness and response, etc.). Additionally, policy issues related to migration and climate 
adaptation - such as economic development, agriculture, urban development, climate and 
environmental change, disaster preparedness and response - should not be treated in sectoral silos, 
rather harmonised to reap maximum benefit for affected sectors and communities. 
 
Socioeconomic and political contexts of human societies also affect rural livelihoods, particularly the 
agricultural sector – and hence, have a strong potential to impact adaptation measures taken in this 
sector (Smit and Skinner 2002). For example, the underlying causes of vulnerability - which were 
shown to be rooted in socioeconomic deprivation, food insecurity, underdevelopment and rural-urban 
market inequality in this synthesis - amplify climate risks especially during disasters. Unless these 
underlying causes of rural vulnerability and out-migration are addressed, rural households will 
continue to remain exposed to risks which can further erode their incomes and adaptive capacities 
during shocks and stresses. A critical role can be played by government initiatives, such as the 
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), if their outreach is improved to expand coverage and 
delivery to households vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity in climate-risk areas. 
  
The research evidence presented in this synthesis reinforces what has been said in recent literature on 
migration-climate nexus in Pakistan. Rather than being seen as a problem to be solved or contained, 
migration should be seen as a socioeconomic phenomenon that can enhance rural adaptive capacity 
and spur rural development (Qaisrani et al. 2017). In areas where migration seems to positively 
contribute to community adaptation and resilience, investments should be made in facilitating 
migration in a safe and regulated manner, while also strengthening transport and financial 
infrastructure for remittances, etc. In other areas, the priority should be to make climate resilience 
investment in the communities of migrant origin. Based on results presented in this synthesis, the 
following policy recommendations are proposed: 
 
1. Developing a national policy on internal migration. 
 
There is need for a national policy on internal migration in Pakistan which can regularise internal 
mobility and labour migration, with a focus on rural-to-urban migration. Such a policy should be well 
integrated into climate change adaptation policies and action plans, as well with relevant sectoral 
policies and public sector programmes. It should be complemented by investment in research, data 
collection and capacity building to improve understanding of the migration-climate nexus. 
 
2. Monitoring and regulating labour market supply-demand gaps. 
 
Labour market wage differentials are a primary driver of rural-to-urban migration, therefore, a 
mechanism needs to be developed that can monitor and regulate labour market supply-demand gaps, 
such as the dearth of labour in a particular urban setting, and its surplus in a rural market. Such a 
mechanism can help regulate labour mobility in internal migration hotspots (such as the Upper Indus 
Basin) by ‘match-making’ demand and supply of labour (skills and needs). 
 
3. Promoting rural livelihood diversification. 
 
There is a need to promote rural livelihood diversification through extensive programmes focusing on 
the rural workforce that is increasingly shifting away from agriculture, and is in search of alternative 
livelihoods. For such populations, there is a need to introduce technical and vocational training 
programmes, with a particular focus on rural women. 
 
4. Strengthening social safety programmes, access to health/education services, and 
investments in climate-resilient infrastructure. 
 
The underlying causes of rural vulnerability need to be rooted out by strengthening social safety 
programmes that target poverty reduction, boost food security, and social equality in rural areas, with 
a particular focus on vulnerable groups, such as women. There is also a need for improvements in 
access to health and education services, in addition to investments in climate-resilient infrastructure.  
 
5. Improving rural fiscal resilience. 
 
Rural areas need to be provided institutional support for improved fiscal resilience. Migrant 
households could be given advisory support, for example, about where to invest their remittances in a 
way that can enhance both resilience and livelihoods of households. Efforts should be made to 
improve access to formal channels of credit to rural communities, especially small and subsistence 
farmers, because access to credit and loans is critical for rural households in adapting to climate 
change and coping during climate disasters and duress.  
 
6. Enhancing service and delivery of agricultural extension programmes. 
 
Rural support for climate adaptation should also aim to improve service and delivery of rural 
agricultural extension programmes. The government should start initiatives that support small 
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